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ABSTRACT
By combining accurate real time data collection,
statistical process control (SPC) methods, and a reliable
simulation program, system engineers and Naval logisticians
will be better able to realize real savings in monetary terms,
increased Operational Availability and decreased mission time.
This study concentrates on one weapon system, the 5" 54
MK 45 gun system. We developed a real time data collection
program that is currently being used by Comarco Engineering
Support Division to collect data from naval gunfire support
missions. SPC methods are then used to identify deficiencies
with specific blocks of the gun system. By having a reliable
simulation of the weapon system, like the one written at NPS
for the 5" 54 MK 45, the program manager is better able to
evaluate the various alternatives of spending the program's
money; e.g., increase the reliability of a component or reduce
the repair time. In this way he is better able to allocate
his budget more effectively in order to improve the readiness
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I . INTRODUCTION
During the Reagan Presidency, the United States military-
went through an enormous build up. Money seemed almost
inexhaustible, but with the breakup of the Russian war-
fighting machine, and the end of the cold war era, the United
States military has been left without a large and dangerous
adversary. Conseguently, domestic issues, the most important
being the national debt, have become priority issues with
President Clinton. As the U. S. Navy along with the other
armed services are forced to downsize, due to budgetary
constraints, each must ensure that its budgetary dollars are
being spent wisely, without decreasing the readiness of our
nation's armed forces.
Today's war-fighting machines are extremely complex in
design, operation and maintenance. Each individual component
that goes into a complex weapon system is designed and
engineered for a specific reliability. Individual components
are combined into blocks, which are major subsections of the
weapon systems. These blocks in turn determine the weapon
system's overall reliability design goal.
Ultimately, the time it takes to complete a mission,
employing that complex weapon system, is derived from the
weapon system's reliability, and the corrective maintenance
that is employed (Blanchard, 1992, p. 70). Currently, there
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does not exist a real time accurate reporting system or
database to track individual block reliability and their
repair rates. The Naval Warfare Assessment Center has been
tasked to maintain and operate a database on all shipboard
weapons systems. But, the inputs they currently receive to
update the database from the fleet have left doubts to the
validity of the database.
We have developed a real time data collection program to
accurately collect data from naval gunfire support missions.
Coupled with a program, developed at the Naval Postgraduate
School, that simulates the 5" 54 MK 45 weapon system, and
statistical process control methods to monitor the weapon
system, we are better able to draw conclusions about the 5" 54
MK 45 weapon system.
The objectives of this thesis are to show that a tool
such as Lotus 123 can be utilized to write a data collection
program, and combined with an accurate simulation of the
weapon system, enhance Operational Availability, and decrease
mission time. Block failures and the time it takes to repair
them can be collected during Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS)
exercises, and later analyzed. Then, by using a Statistical
Process Control (SPC), the database can be analyzed by Navy
logisticians and engineers to identify training and mechanical
problems, and engineering deficiencies within a block on a
specific ship. Deficiencies then can be concentrated on and
overcome.
This study concentrates on one weapon system, the 5" 54
MK 45 Mod gun system, but the methodology can be utilized
for any complex weapon system. We will be focusing on the
performance and failures of components of the gun system
during NGFS missions, and the time it takes to conduct
corrective maintenance after a block failure. By providing a
tool such as a real time data collection and simulation
program for the gun system, the Navy will be better able to
realize real savings in Operational Availability whether it is
measured in mission performance or in monetary terms. An
accurate database for the weapon system can help identify
those components that would be the best candidate for some
sort of monetary infusion, whether it be in training for
faster block repair, re-engineering for easier repair or
higher reliability, modularization of a component, or a
multitude of other options (Bailey et al., 1992). A Navy
logistician or system engineer, utilizing the weapon system
simulation program could save the Navy money by accurately
forecasting what benefits would be anticipated by an increase
in block reliability, or faster repair rates and whether these
options are going to be worth the expenditure of money.
Because of the technical complexity of this thesis and the
time limitation, we do not intend to get into the logistical
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nature of how many spare parts should be stocked and where, or
how many technical maintenance men and their experience and
rank there should be for each gun mount. We understand these
are important issues that can have a significant impact on
system repair time, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Recent work by Bailey, Bartroli, Kang, and Callahan,
(1992) has led to the idea and continued research for this
thesis. Currently, Mr. Callahan of Comarco Engineering
Support Division is collecting data from NGFS exercises using
a prototype real time data collection program, written in
Lotus 123. Results are being used to update the 5" 54 MK 45
gun system simulation. The gun system simulation program is
currently undergoing tests to verify its validity.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provides
a brief overview of the 5" 54 MK 45 gun system, reliability,
SPC, and the measurement of mission time. Chapter III
provides the reader with the methodology used to develop the
Lotus 123 data collection program, the simulation program, and
SPC methods used to analyze block and component failures.
Chapter IV provides an analysis of data collected during NGFS
missions, and how it is used to update and run the simulation
of the gun system. Chapter V provides the reader with
conclusions and recommendations. The following is a list of
the Appendices which are referenced throughout this thesis:
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION
A ABBREVIATIONS
B RELIABILITY BLOCK NAMES
C EQUATIONS FOR OPERATIONAL AND INHERENT
AVAILABILITY
D EXAMPLES FROM REMOTE ACCESS PRODUCTS
SCREENS
E SHIPS PROGRAM-GUN SYSTEM DATA COLLECTION
SCREENS
F SPOTTERS PROGRAM DATA COLLECTION SCREENS
G PROJECTILE AND POWDER DATA FROM 44 SHIPS
H DATA COLLECTED AND USED IN THE ANALYSIS
I SIMULATION DATA SHEETS
II. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
For years, the United States Naval forces have been built
and structured toward their Soviet opponents. But, for over
thirty five years of cold war tension, there was never a
single exchange of fire. Yet, at the same time, the Navy has
found itself engaged in numerous conflicts with lesser powers.
Some would say that less threatening but perhaps more likely
dangers have been given less attention and planning. (Breemer,
1983, p. 4) Our complex and sophisticated carrier battle
groups and amphibious readiness groups are designed and have
proven devastating against adversaries large and small. But,
with the retirement of the four WWII Iowa class Battleships
and their 16" guns, the Navy has left its Naval Gunfire
Support (NGFS) mission to the 5" 54 MK 45 gun system.
With the U. S. Navy downsizing, the 5" 54 MK 45 gun
system is destined to be the workhorse of the fleet, from air
and small craft defense to NGFS missions. The Navy is banking
on this multi-mission weapon system to perform for many years
to come. The Navy must therefore place an emphasis on the
weapons system's reliability and mission performance.
The gun system was approved for service in July, 1972.
Currently, there are two different configurations of the
weapon system operating in the fleet. The Mod has been
installed on the Nuclear Powered Guided Missile Cruiser (CGN-
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36 and 38) class ships, and the Landing Helicopter Assault
(LHA-1) class ships. The Mod 1 has been installed on the
Destroyer (DD-963), Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG-993), and
the Guided Missile Cruiser (CG-47) class ships. (Commander,
Naval Sea Systems Command, 1985, p. 1-1)
The 5" 54 MK 45 gun system is an automatic, light weight,
dual purpose weapon system capable of firing 16 to 20 rounds
per minute depending on elevation. Its operational
characteristics are as follows:
Train limits 340 deg
Maximum Train Velocity 30 deg/sec
Train Acceleration 60 deg/sec
Elevation Limits -15 deg to +65 deg
Maximum Elevation Velocity 20 deg/sec
Elevation Acceleration 40 deg/sec
A simplified pictorial of the 5" 54 MK 45 Mod gun system is
shown in Figure 2-1. Reliability block names for the gun
system are shown in Appendix B. (Commander, Naval Sea Systems
Command, 1985, p. 2-1) The gun system is capable of firing
a number of different projectiles for different missions, and
the Navy is still developing other projectiles from laser
guided projectiles like the U. S. Army's Copperhead to a
rocket assisted long range projectile, in order to enhance
this weapon systems multi-mission role. (Breemer, 1983, pp.
79-83)






Figure 2.1. 5" 54 MK 45 Gun System
(NAVSEA ILSP 021-P/D)
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Performance of NGFS missions may be measured in terms of
mission time, block and weapon system reliability, Operational
Availability and Inherent Availability. Mission time is
defined as the time it takes a ship to complete a firing
mission and destroy all of her assigned targets. Mission time
may include firing time, and down time due to gun system
failures. If the mission can not be completed because the gun
system has become inoperable and can not be repaired, mission
time will end when the ship removes itself from the gun line
or conflict. (Callahan, 1993)
Reliability is "the probability that a system or product
will perform in a satisfactory manner for a given period of
time when used under specified operating conditions"
(Blanchard, 1992, p. 14). Reliability measurements are based
on the number of failures per total operating time. The Navy
requires the use of Mission Profile criteria in order to
calculate reliability factors. Mission Profile calculations
allow senior military commanders to more accurately predict
the amount of total firepower that is required on-scene to
complete a specific mission in a specific time frame.
Reliability allocation and design goals are used to build
complex weapon systems. For the 5" 54 MK 45 Mod gun system,
the reliability design goal was .90. This reliability goal
was then allocated among the various 55 blocks that make up
the gun system. Components that make up the blocks were then
9
engineered and combined together to make up that individual
block's reliability design goal. This in turn represents the
freguency of corrective maintenance that will be reguired for
the block, and the logistical resources that will be reguired
to sustain the gun system. (Commander, Naval Sea Systems
Command, 1985, p. 1-3)
Block and system level reliability calculations are based
on time elements (calendar time, active time, inactive time,
uptime, downtime, energized time, and secured time), event
elements (number of failure events, number of failure events
with measured downtime, number of logistic delays, number of
outside assistance delays), cycle/rounds fired elements
(number of cycles, and number of rounds fired), and usage
factors (duty factor, demand factor, program manager demand
factor, usage factor, and 100 percent use factor).
(Commander, NWAC, Readiness, 1993, pp. B3401 . 010- . 020
)
Operational Availability is the probability that a weapon
system, block or part is in an operable state when needed.
Inherent Availability is the probability that the weapon
system, block or part is in an operable state, when needed in
an ideal support environment (all reguired parts, manpower,
and training are available on board) . (Commander, NWAC,
Remote, 1993, p. A3401.028)
For system level calculations, the Navy assumes that the
system follows a Markov process. A Markov process is "A
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description of a system state behavior where the system is in
a certain state at a specific time, and the probability law of
a future system state of existence depends only upon the
current state and not on how the system has arrived in that
state" (Commander, NWAC, Readiness, 1993, p. B3401.082). To
calculate weapon system and block Operational and Inherent
Availabilities for a specific weapon system, the Navy
currently uses the equations and definitions included in
Appendix C. Currently the block and system level
reliability is what allows tacticians and operational
commanders the ability to predict how any ship's gun system
will perform during specified missions. Predictability is
knowledge, and the more knowledge a commander "in the field"
has, the better chance he will have in defeating his opponent.
There are many methods that may be used to monitor the
weapon system. We have chosen to use control charts and
Pareto analysis. These Statistical Process Control (SPC)
methods allow us to gain knowledge and monitor a ship's gun
system and disseminate it from the highest policy makers, down
to the "wrench turners" on the ships.
The major objective of SPC is to detect the occurrence of
uncontrollable variation, so that investigation of the process
and corrective action may be taken. "The main benefit of SPC
is predictability, for process performance will not vary over
time so long as process control is maintained." ( Schonberger
,
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1991, p. 645) A process is a unique combination of
materials, manpower, operating procedures , weapon system, data
collection methods, maintenance, and management. If you
change a particular aspect of the process, you will change its
outcome. These changes in the process whether they be changes
in personnel, sloppy or stringent maintenance policies, or
different gun systems on different ships will lead to some
common cause for controllable variation.
Controllable variation is characterized by a "stable and
consistent pattern of variation over time. " Controllable
variation is directly linked to changes in the process. Some
examples of controllable variation are: different gun crews
troubleshoot problems differently due to the past history of
the gun, and different skill levels of technicians can lead to
longer or shorter repair times.
Uncontrolled variation "is characterized by a pattern of
variation that changes over time." These changes can be
attributed to assignable or special causes. Not only do these
assignable causes have a marked impact upon the variation of
the data, but they also undermine predictability. (Wheeler,
1985, pp. 4-6) In addition to the multitude of chance or
common causes, occasionally there are assignable or special
causes that will have a large impact on the criteria we use to
measure NGFS performance (mission time, block and weapon
system reliability, Operational and Inherent Availability)
.
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Some examples of uncontrolled variation caused by assignable
or special causes are: a poorly trained gun crew whose repair
times are far longer than the fleets average, and poorly
engineered spare parts leading to an increase in block
failures
.
Control charts and Pareto analysis may be used to
estimate the parameters of a process (repair rates, MTBF ' s )
,
and through this process, determine and improve process
capability. The control chart is an effective way to detect
and eventually reduce variability. Control chart theory is
based on the Central Limit Theorem in statistics. "When
samples are periodically drawn from a process and the average
of each group calculated, these averages will form
approximately a normal distribution regardless of the
distribution of the individual readings of the process or
parent population." Processes are viewed as being in control
or out of control. An in control process is one that has only
controllable variation caused by pure randomness in the sample
data. An out of control process is one that has
uncontrollable variation caused by assignable or special
causes. A process is in control when all the points of the
process plot between the upper and lower control limits, and
there does not appear to be a systematic pattern or trend. A
process is viewed as out of control when a process plots
outside of the upper or lower control limits; signifying
13
excessive variation, or behaves in a systematic or non-random
manner leading to a pattern. Processes that appear out of
control must be investigated for assignable causes. An
example of a control chart complete with upper and lower
control and process limits is shown in Figure 2.2. (Bhote,
1988, p. 28)
A type I error is concluding the process is out of
control when it really is in control. This can be seen when
a process plots outside the upper or lower control limits, but
the cause is purely by random chance and not by some
assignable cause. A type II error is concluding the process
is in control when it is actually out of control. Type II
errors can be seen when the process plots between the upper
and lower control limits, but can be linked to some specific
assignable cause. The chance of type I and II errors
appearing in the SPC are decreased by increasing the sample
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4 5 6 7
OBSERVATIONS
Figure 2.2. Control Chart
The Pareto chart is very useful and easy to use. It
allows the engineers, and training commands to concentrate on
which blocks are causing the longest delays in repairs by
identifying those blocks that are causing the most downtime or
longest repair times for the gun system. On the vertical axis
of a Pareto chart the percent of occurrences is listed, and on
the horizontal axis, the blocks are listed. Figure 2.3 is an
example of a Pareto chart. ( Schonberger , 1991, p. 665)
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60.5
Block #1 Block #2 Block #3 Block #4 Block #5
FAILED BLOCKS
Figure 2.3. Pareto Analysis Chart
Whenever statistical methods such as SPC are employed, it
is always possible that the decision reached will be
incorrect. This is because partial information, obtained from
a sample data collection, is used to draw conclusions about
the entire population. For example, data collected may
indicate that the particular component is failing excessively
and falling above the upper control limit, and thus that
particular process is out of control. The process may not be
out of control, the excessive failures the ship is seeing in
16
one particular block may be attributed to randomness. This is
the type I error. (Weiss, 1991, p. 248)
The Navy has conducted two reliability, maintainability,
and availability (RMA) tests on the 5" 54 MK 45 Mod gun
system since its introduction. One, in October 1972 aboard
the USS NORTON SOUND (AVM-1), that proved the Mod conceptual
design was sound. The other RMA test was conducted between
January and December 1984, utilizing fleet data submitted by





MLDT (hours) 2 6.6
MDTdto (hours) 19.0
MDT (hours) 54.9
MDTdto = MDToa + MDTops + MDTt + MDTd
MDT = MDTs + MDTu
MDTs= Mean-Scheduled-Downtime
See Appendix C for abbreviation definitions. (Commander, Naval
Sea Systems Command, 1985, p. 1-5)
Since 1985, the Navy no longer conducts RMA tests. The
Naval Warfare Assessment Center (NWAC) in Corona, CA.
collects, edits, verifies, and validates fleet inputs for all
shipboard systems. These fleet inputs are then loaded into
the OP-03 Material Readiness Data Base (MRDB). The NWAC then
provides remote access for over 100 users (PMS, ISEAS,
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contractors) to the MRDB, and publishes the OP-03 Material
Readiness Assessment Report semi-annually. (Commander, NWAC,
Remote, p. A3401.006)
Fleet inputs come from the 3M System, casualty reports
(CASREPS), received monthly from the Ships Parts Control
Center (SPCC), employment tapes, received quarterly from SPCC,
steaming hours, and other sources (technical representative
ship assists, 3-M, foreign logs, etc). The weapon system
Program Manager provides equipment specific assessment
criteria such as: editing criteria, reliability block
diagrams, time meter assignments for each reliability block,
demand factors based on wartime mission profiles, operational
assumptions, and reliability, maintainability, and assessment
thresholds, so the NWAC can process all fleet inputs.
(Commander, NWAC, Remote, 1993, p. A3401.010)
Once users access the MRDB, they have five product
selections to choose from; equipment level products, block
level products, parts products, narrative products, and time
meter products. After product selection, there are numerous
detailed screens to analyze data from. See Appendix D for some
examples of the screens and the types of information
available
.
Currently, the MRDB is the one source for material
readiness measures, utilizing standard measurement criteria,
and standardized methodology. Since its introduction in 1985,
18
79 equipment/systems have been added, and with more funding,
other shipboard systems will be added to the MRDB . Figure 2.4
lists all the shipboard systems the Navy would like the MRDB
to consist of. (Commander, NWAC, p. A3401.102)
Utilization of the MRDB helps identify design changes,
compendium of fleet feedback, for follow on equipment/systems,
spare parts usage and supportability incurred, maintenance
problems, fleet feedback through "lessons learned," and
prioritization of ordered alterations (ORDALTS), spare parts,
and training. The management and operation of the MRDB is
crucial because its data is provided to: The CNO Readiness
Improvement Program, Red Flag Systems, SEA-06 Readiness Based
Sparing, OP-9 14 Manpower, Personnel, and Training (PM&T), SEA-
06Q/PMs/ISEAs Special Requests, and SEA-06Q No Failure
Evident. With such wide utilization and important decisions
being based on this database, the Navy must ensure it is
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Figure 2.4. Systems Planned For Incorporation Into The MRDB
(Commander, NWAC, Remote Access, 1993)
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Unfortunately, the MRDB system has left doubts to its
validity. The database is only as accurate as its most
accurate inputs. From the author's fleet experience, the data
that has been submitted and is being used to update the MRDB,
are not exact. There are times when reports will not be
submitted because the weapon system was "only down for an hour
or two, " and the ships crew or Commanding Officer makes the
decision not to report it. However, when reported, times for
delay in receipt of parts, manhours reguired to repair the
system, and the actual time the weapon system was down are
usually just estimates, not exact numbers. What is needed is
simple real time data collection to ensure the validity and
accuracy of fleet inputs, so that the MRDB may be accurately
and efficiently utilized to base important decisions on.
By utilizing only real time data collected from ships
that have gualified on the gun range, we can determine new
reliability baselines for each of the weapon system's blocks
(for the powder and projectile blocks, we can use data from
any ship that fires the gun, not just gualifying ships).
These reliability baselines can be used to form reliability
block means for MTBF and repair times, whereby SPC measures
can be utilized. Navy engineers, weapon system training
program coordinators, logisticians and a multitude of others
can use these reliability block means to judge the performance
of the weapon system and identify and prioritize areas that
21
can be improved. Ship's Commanding Officers can use the
reliability block means and resulting SPC measures to judge
the performance of its crew and weapons system during drills,
pacfires, or gun qualifications.
Mission time and Operational Availability calculations
will only be determined by those ships that have qualified on
the gun range. This is an important point. If the ship does
not qualify on the gun range, she does not deploy. Only those
ships that deploy will be involved in real combat missions.
It is therefore extremely important to be basing high level
decisions with regard to shore bombardment, call for fire,
counter battery fire and a multitude of other mission
profiles, on a mission time and Operational Availability
calculation that is based on deployed assets whose weapon
system and gun crews have proven their proficiency by
previously qualifying at the gun range.
In this chapter we reviewed the terms and techniques used
to measure mission time, block and system reliability, and
Operational and Inherent Availability. We discussed the use
of two SPC methods, control charts and Pareto analysis, to
monitor the weapon system, and introduced the current system
being used and the MRDB for material readiness measures. The
following chapter, Methodology and Data, will illustrate the
data collection and simulation programs, and how they can be
utilized to accurately base decisions on.
22
III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
We developed a data collection program that Comarco
Engineering Support Division is currently using to gather
real-time data from NGFS exercises at the United States Naval
gun range on Viegues Island off Puerto Rico. This program is
written in Lotus 123 Ver 2.3. The data that was collected was
utilized to update an NGFS simulation. The simulation of the
weapon system was then verified, and used to measure mission
performance. Once a weapon system database can be written and
collected data input, statistical process control procedures
can be used to identify training, and engineering
deficiencies. The weapon system simulation, and SPC
procedures provide one method the Navy can utilize to
accurately base operational, training, logistical, and
engineering decisions on.
The data collection program is actually two programs
wrapped in one (Figure 3.1). One part of the program is used
by personnel collecting data from the ship, about the actual
gun mounts and their characteristics during the NGFS exercise
(Appendix E). The other part of the program is used by the
spotters, on the range. This part of the program collects




5 INCH 54 MK45 NAVAL GUN SYSTEM DATA COLLECTION PROGRAM
A
G
Spotters program -Ammunition data collection
Ships program -Gun system data collection
Press one of the indicated keys to continue
Q-Quit program
Figure 3.1. Initial Program Screen
The data collection program must be run on Lotus 123 Ver
2.3 or higher. Once the user retrieves the program, the
program automatically attaches Wysiwyg, and moves to the first
screen. Clearly labeled selections and screen movements
highlight this program making it guick and easy to obtain real
time data during a NGFS mission.
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The ship's program, which collects data about the actual
gun mounts, first prompts the user for the type of mission the
ship will shoot. One of two mounts, mount 51 or mount 52, is
then selected. The program then moves to the next screen that
allows the user to input the on-station time, ready time,
and/or counter battery time, and starts recording shots fired.
When shots are fired, the mission shot round, time the shot
was fired, cycle time between shots, mount number, and total
rounds fired since the exercise began are all recorded. When
a mount fails during the exercise, the user has the
opportunity to shift mounts and continue with the exercise.
If mounts are shifted, data such as the mission shot round,
the time the mount failed, the mount number, and the block,
that failed is recorded for the failed mount. If at anytime
during the exercise the gun mount is repaired, the user is
reguired to record this. The time the mount was repaired and
total repair time is then recorded. When the mission is
completed, the program records this time. The user then has
the opportunity to record the firing of another mission or end
the program and record the results as a separate Lotus 123
spreadsheet in a user specified file. Figure 3.2 shows the
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Figure 3.2. Output From A Simulated Exercise
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The spotters data collection program collects data
pertaining to impact time and the characteristics of the round
fired. The initial screen allows the user to record whether
the round was functional (exploded), non functional (did not
explode), lost (round was unseen by spotter), hit (round hit
the target) or repeat (fire same profile). Once the user
makes a choice from this screen, the impact time of the round
is recorded. If the round was not a lost, hit or repeat
round, the spotter will radio corrections to the ship to bring
the next round to be fired closer to hitting the target.
These corrections for functional, and non-functional rounds
are recorded as they are radioed to the ship. Corrections may
include any combination of the six code words (left, right,
add, drop, up, down) followed by some yardage. Figure 3.3
shows the data collected from a simulated NGFS mission using
the spotter data collection program.
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Spotter/Ammo Data Collection
Rnd Function/ Impact Time MPI Left Right Add Drop Up Down
Nbr NonFunctior Nbr Nbr Nbr Nbr Nbr Nbr
1 Function 11 :19:35 AM 223.6068 200 100
2 Function 11 :19:42 AM 25.0000 25
3 Hit 11 19:47 AM
4 Hit 11 19:48 AM
5 Hit 11 19:49 AM
6 NoNFunctior 11 19:51 AM 0.0000
7 Hit 11 19:58 AM
8 Hit 11 19:59 AM
9 Function 11 20:03 AM 25.0000 25
10 Hit 11 20:10 AM
11 Hit 11 20:11 AM
12 NoNFunctior 11 20:13 AM 25.0000 25 25
13 Function 11 20:24 AM 0.0000 50
14 Repeat 11 20:36 AM
15 Hit 11 20:37 AM
16 Hit 11 20:38 AM
17 Hit 11 20:40 AM
18 Hit 11 20:41 AM
19 Lost 11: 20:43 AM
Figure 3.3. Spotter Program Simulated Output
Information from the data collection program pertaining
to ships information, the gun system, and ammunition, is then
input into the weapon system database. The database is used
to update the reliability of the fifty five blocks that
comprise the 5" 54 MK 45 gun system. Currently, the data
collection program, database, and simulation program do not
"talk", so information must be input from one program's
results to the next program. The simulation is then run
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repeatedly in order to come up with statistically valid
results
.
The simulation program was developed at NPS. In order to
validate the simulation program of the weapon system, the
program was loaded with one specific mission profile. The
mission is a Marine Corps scenario which requires the Navy,
utilizing NGFS, to destroy eighteen targets in a specified
amount of time. The simulation was run a number of times to
come up with an accurate, simulated, mission time. Once the
simulation program has been validated, other NGFS scenarios
and mission profiles may be input into the simulation program,
in order to accurately predict mission times for those
specific NGFS scenarios. Currently, the weapon system
simulation program has proven extremely accurate compared to
the results obtained during real NGFS missions. The accuracy
of the simulation is very important and will play a key role
in the cost savings analysis.
In order to spend our money wisely, decreasing mission
time with the least amount of money, we will utilize a SPC
method, the Pareto analysis chart. With the use of a Pareto
analysis chart, we can decide which weapon system block failed
the most and should be analyzed for further modification.
Modifications could have included the re-engineering of
specific components of the block or modifications to the gun
system to make the block easier to repair. Then, by using the
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weapon system simulation program, we can analyze the cost for
modification, to the savings in mission time.
By investing money in the modification of a specific
weapon system block, we gain an anticipated MTTR and
conditional probability based on its estimated failure
percentage. These figures are input into the weapon system
simulation program. The simulation program is then run
several times to gain a new simulated mission time. Engineers
and the weapon system program manager can analyze the new
simulated mission time and the cost to achieve it and decide
whether to invest the money or look for a different
alternative to improve the Operational Availability of the gun
system and decrease its mission time.
The database can also be used to draw control charts
pertaining to MTTR and MRBF for each of the weapon systems
blocks. These control charts become great tools to a ships
Commanding Officer and weapon system engineers. By plotting
each failure and time to repair on the block specific control
chart, we can quickly and easily determine if the gun system
is in or out of control. If the gun system is determined to
be out of control, the failure can be analyzed and a special
cause determined. Special causes may be a poorly trained gun
crew, or a gun system that has not been fully "groomed" for
action. In any case, block specific control charts provide a
quick and easy way to analyze the gun shoot.
30
A weapon system simulation and SPC methods are powerful
tools that can be used to increase Operational Availability,
and decrease mission time. Why spend thousands or millions of
dollars modifying a weapon system block if we do not decrease
our mission time? Or, if we do decrease the mission time, how
much money should we spend for each second or minute, and is
it really worth the money? These are questions for the
engineers and program managers to answer.
In this chapter we reviewed and discussed the benefits of
the real time data collection and simulation programs. We
followed with two SPC methods that can be utilized to help
determine the best way to decrease mission time with what
money may be available to the program manager. The following
chapter, Analysis of Collected Data, illustrates and analyzes
simulated data collected via the real time data collection
program, and other data collection means. Specific data is
then used to update the simulation program which is run for
three different NGFS missions and the simulated results are
then compared to real NGFS missions. Control charts and
Pareto analysis charts are then created utilizing the
collected data, and their benefits discussed.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA
A large portion of the data that will be analyzed was
collected by Comarco Engineering Support Division from April
1991 through April 1993. This data was collected by means of
paper and pen, and ships and spotter operating sheets, not the
newly created program via Lotus 123.
From April 1991 through April 1993, fifty Navy ships were
scheduled for data collection. Of the fifty ships, four
aborted prior to shooting, and two aborted during
qualification. Because it does not matter which gun fires the
5" projectiles, (5" 54 MK 45 Mod 0, Mod 1, or 5" MK 42) the
remaining forty four ships were used to calculate reliability
figures for the projectile, and powder blocks.
Appendix G shows the data that was collected and combined
for the forty four ships. Of the 5027 rounds fired, there
were 9 powder delays. This led to a powder block failure rate
of .179%. Of the 5027 rounds fired, 2270 were HE (high
explosive) of which there were 48 HE duds (rounds that failed
to explode), 2241 were puff (dummy) of which 46 were duds, and
516 were star (illumination) of which 80 were observed to have
delays. This led to a HE projectile failure rate of 2.115%,
a puff projectile failure rate of 2.053%, and a star
projectile failure rate of 15.504%.
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Of the forty four ships, six fired spotter exercises vice
firing for qualification. Of the thirty eight ships that
fired for qualification, thirty five were 5" 54 MK 45
shooters. Of those thirty five ships, only twenty eight of
them fired for qualification. The other seven ships either
aborted during the gun shoot, or were scheduled to shoot for
modified qualifications. Of these twenty eight ships
scheduled to shoot for full qualification, data from 14 of the
ships was collected on the ship and at the observation post.
Appendix H shows the fourteen ships from which data was
collected, the number of rounds fired, the total number of gun
failures observed, the failed blocks MTTR and the failed block
percent of failures. Unfortunately, ship specific data sheets
could not be obtained and analyzed to come up with which ship
had what gun failure, and exact repair times for block repair
rates. Although it would have been nice to be able to work
with the exact numbers obtained through the observations, it
is not terribly important, the methodology is the same. We
have filled in the gaps of missing data with some of our own.
Using the data collected from the fourteen ships, we can
now begin to draw some fundamental conclusions about the 5" 54
MK 45 gun system. We can draw these conclusions because we
know the data has been collected from those ships that have
qualified during NGFS exercises. These ships have proven that
their 5" 54 MK 45 gun system and its crew are ready to deploy.
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These ships will be the ones chosen to fight first and thus
should give us the best information from which we can base
decisions about predicting mission time, and re-engineering or
improving specific block reliabilities in order to lower
mission time.
The Pareto analysis chart, Figure 4.1, shows the
beginning of a pattern. The fuse setter, block number 5, has
failed eight times during the 1219 rounds fired. MTTR this
type of gun failure has been 920 seconds or a little over 15
minutes. Navy engineers can use this data to study block 5 of
the weapon system to determine what part is failing and why it
is failing. Then, by determining how much it would cost to
correct the problem or at least increase the overall
reliability of the block, we can plug the newly anticipated
block 5 reliability figures into the weapon system simulation
model and determine how much of a decrease in mission time we
obtain, and calculate the increased gun system and block
reliabilities. The weapon system program manager can then
determine whether it is worth spending the money correcting







Block #5 I Block #41 I Block #2 I Block #16
Block #7 Block #43 Block #9 Block #37
FAILED BLOCKS
Figure 4.1. Pareto Analysis Of Collected Data
The weapon system simulation is an extremely important
part of our analysis. Without it we would have to spend the
money on improving the deficiency found in block 5 and then go
and collect more data to see if it was effective in decreasing
mission time and by how much. This of course takes time. The
weapon system simulation allows us to make intelligent
decisions based on a model without spending any money. The
key to the weapon system simulation is proving its accuracy.
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We used the data collected from nine of the fourteen
ships to analyze the accuracy of the weapon system simulation
program. These nine ships fired the same three missions and
therefore yielded the average mission times listed below.
SHIP NAME MISSION TYPE AND TIME IN SECOND
Z-40-G Z-42-G Z-43-G
USS STUMP 643 667 337
USS GETTYSBURG 423 842 332
USS BRISCOE 349 633 329
USS HUE CITY 567 558 338
USS O'BANNON 261 547 390
USS MOOSEBRUGGER 455 449 196
USS PETERSEN 247 469 283
USS HAYLER 195 405 381
USS VIRGINIA 5JLL 845 339
AVERAGE TIME 458 601 325
Z-40-G AVERAGE MISSION TIME = 7 Min 38 Seconds
Z-42-G AVERAGE MISSION TIME = 10 Min 1 Second
Z-43-G AVERAGE MISSION TIME = 5 Min 25 Seconds
(Comarco, 1993, pp. 1-10)
The weapon system simulation was updated using the data
from Appendix G and Appendix H, and run for each of the three
missions listed; Z-40-G, Z-42-G and Z-43-G. Appendix I
illustrates the weapon system simulation output and average
mission times obtained. As you can see from the combined data
below:
MISSION ACTUAL MISSION TIME SIMULATED MISSION TIME
Z-40-G 7 Min 38 Seconds 7 Min 13 Seconds
Z-42-G 10 Min 1 Second 10 Min Seconds
Z-43-G 5 Min 25 Seconds 5 Min 47 Seconds
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The weapon system simulation program proved to be extremely
accurate in predicting mission time. (Comarco, 1993, pp. 11-
14)
Control charts are a real guick and easy way to analyze
a gun shoot. The real users of the control charts would be
the operators; the ship's crew. Although data has been
collected on fifty percent of the available assets scheduled
for data collection, 14 of 28 ships, we do not currently have
enough data available to accurately produce control charts for
MTTR and MRBF for any of the fifty five blocks. In order to
discuss control charts we will take some liberties with the
data from Appendix H.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 are examples of MTTR and MRBF
control charts for block 5, the fuse setter. Due to the lack
of collected data, we have given the control charts some
arbitrary means, and upper and lower bounds based on the three
sigma rule. For our purposes, a sample or observation is an
observed failure. As the control chart reveals, seven of the
eight repair times recorded were within our control limits.
The second observed failure took 1060 seconds to repair. This
plots above the upper control limit and is therefore flagged
as a potential problem. The ship's Weapons Officer would then
be interested in investigating the cause for this excessive
repair time. By using the three sigma rule, we will be saying
that there is a ( 100%-99 . 73%) or .27% likelihood that this
37
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Figure 4.2. Mean-Time-To-Repair Control Chart
BLOCK 5. FUZE SETTER
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Figure 4.3. Mean-Rounds-Between-Failure Control Chart
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excessive repair time occurred entirely by chance, and a
99.73% chance that it was caused by a non-random, assignable
cause. By investigating, the Weapons Officer may find out
that the crew is not properly trained, or that the proper
tools were not onhand for the repair. These problems can then
be addressed and corrected, thereby decreasing the ships
mission time.
Figure 4.3 is an example of a MRBF control chart for
block 5, the fuse setter. Because we were unable to review
the original data, we could not accurately come up with the
rounds between each fuse setter error, so we chose some
arbitrary numbers which have been plotted on the control
chart. As can be seen, one of the observations plotted
outside of the lower control limit.
Once again using the three sigma rule, there is a .27%
chance that this observation was by pure randomness and
therefore will be investigated for special or assignable
causes. The Leading Petty Officer may find that there is a
worn part in the fuse setter assembly that is causing the
weapon system to go down due to a block 5 failure more often
than is the norm. The part could then be replaced, restoring
the weapon system back to a predictable state.
In this chapter we illustrated and analyzed simulated
data collected via the real time data collection program, and
other data collection means. Specific data was used to update
39
the simulation program which was then run for three different
NGFS missions and the simulated results were then compared to
real NGFS mission times. Control charts and Pareto analysis
charts were then created utilizing the collected data, and
their benefits discussed. The following chapter, Conclusions
and Recommendations, summarizes the thesis, and makes
suggestions for further research.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The objective of this thesis was to show that a tool such
as Lotus 123 could be utilized to write an accurate real time
data collection program and combined with a simulation of the
5" 54 MK 45 gun system, enhance Operational Availability and
decrease mission time.
By collecting data on block, failures, and the time it
takes to repair them, we can construct a very accurate weapon
system database. Statistical Process Control methods could
then be used to analyze the database to identify training,
mechanical problems, and engineering deficiencies within a
specific block of the weapon system. By utilizing the weapon
system database, we could update the 5" 54 MK 45 weapon system
simulation program to analyze the best possible solutions for
the least amount of money.
We were successful in developing a real time data
collection program written in Lotus 123 that is currently
being used to collect data from the fleet. This program has
made real time data collection easier and more accurate.
Future program development will see the data collection
program written in executable code, complete with a detailed
instruction manual. The program will also combine the gun and
spotter program into one program in order to allow for just
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one observer on the ship, alleviating the need for another
observer at the gun range.
As of April 1993, prior to the development of the data
collection program, data was collected from over forty-four
ships. From these data sheets the 5" 54 MK 45 weapon system
simulation program was updated and tested. The weapon system
simulation program was programmed to simulate three different
NGFS scenarios, and run five replications. The weapon system
simulation program proved to be an extremely accurate
representation of these three NGFS mission scenarios.
With an accurate real time data collection method and
simulation of the weapon system, we are in a position to
analyze solutions to problems we see in the 5" 54 MK 45 weapon
system. Unfortunately, a database has not been developed to
combine the data collected, but we understand that the
development of a database is underway at Crane Naval Surface
Weapons Center (Callahan, 1993). Current data that has been
collected is awaiting input into such a database, whereby SPC
methods could be utilized to enhance the abilities of Navy
logisticians and engineers in the identification of problems
with the weapon system. The simulation program could then be
used to analyze potential solutions to determine if modifying
a specific block or component, increasing repair training on
a block, or a multitude of other options will significantly
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decrease the mission time to be worth the expenditure of the
money.
The methodology presented in this thesis allows us to
make more informed and accurate decisions with regard to the
expenditure of money on the 5" 54 MK 45 weapon system. This
methodology could easily be expanded to most other weapon
systems and could lead to better use of Navy funds, greater
Operational Availability, and lower mission times.
Further research in this field could be beneficial in the
following areas:
1. Create a non-human way to collect data. This
could be done by placing sensors on each block, of a weapon
system to record failures and repair times. This would
alleviate the need for crew or outside observer participation
in the collection of data. (Callahan, 1993)
2. Provide the fleet with control charts for block
failures and Mean-Time-To-Repair block failures, in order to
help the surface units analyze their NGFS missions, and take
appropriate actions with regards to deficiencies. This could
be expanded into a form of total quality management and be a
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Mean-Time-To-Repair
Naval Gun Fire Support
Naval Postgraduate School
Naval Warfare Assessment Center
Ordered Alterations
Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability
Statistical Process Control
Ships Parts Control Center
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APPENDIX B
5" 54 MK 45 MOD GUN SYSTEM RELIABILITY BLOCK NAMES
1. LOWER ACCUMULATOR SYSTEM
2. LOWER HOIST ASSEMBLY
3. LOADER DRUM ASSEMBLY
4. UPPER HOIST ASSEMBLY
5. FUSE SETTER ASSEMBLY
6. UPPER ACCUMULATOR ASMBLY
7. CRADLE AND RAMMER ASMBLY
8. GUN BARREL HOUSING ASMBLY
9. BREECH MECHANISM
10. RECOIL COUNTERRECOIL SYSTEM
1 1. EMPTY CASE TRAY ASSEMBLY
12. EMPTY CASE EJECTOR ASSEMBLY
13. GUN BARREL ASSEMBLY
14. SLIDE ASSEMBLY
15. ELEVATION POWER DRIVE
16. TRAIN POWER DRIVE
17. ELEVATION RECEIVER REGULATOR
18. TRAIN RECEIVER REGULATOR




23. 440V 60 HZ POWER
24. 115V 60 HZ POWER
25. 1 1 5V 60 HZ FIRING SUPPLY
26. 1 15V 60 HZ LIGHTING SUPPLY
27. 1 15V 400 HZ SYNCHRO SUPPLY
28. 24VDC BATTERY CHARGING CIRCUIT
29. 26VDC POWER SUPPLY
30. +25V SOLENOID SLPPLY CIRCUITS A&B
31. +25V SWITCH Sl'PPLY CIRCUITS A&B
32. +25V SWITCH AND LOGIC Sl'PPLY CIRCUIT
33. +25V PUSHBUTTON SUPPLY CIRCUIT
34. +25 V CONTACTOR Sl'PPLY CIRCUIT
35. +25V LIGHT SUPPLY CIRCUIT
36. +25V LOGIC SUPPLY CIRCUIT
37. +28V WEAPONS CONTROL INFORMATION
38. +5VDC POWER SUPPLY
39. EP3 PANEL





45. EBX1 CABLING AND CONNECTIONS
46. EBX2 CABLING AND CONNECTIONS
47. EBX3 CABLING AND CONNECTIONS
48. EBX4 CABLING AND CONNECTIONS
49. EBX5 CABLING AND CONNECTIONS
50. EBX6 CABLING AND CONNECTIONS
5 1
.
EBX7 CABLING AND CONNECTIONS
52. EBX8 CABLING AND CONNECTIONS
































MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES
MEAN DOWN TIME
MEAN DOWN TIME SCHEDULED
MEAN DOWN TIME UNSCHEDULED
MEAN DOWN TIME DUE TO OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE
MEAN DOWN TIME DUE TO OPERATIONS
MEAN DOWN TIME DUE TO DELAY
MEAN TIME TO REPAIR
MEAN LOGISTICS DELAY TIME
MEAN LOGISTICS TIME
MEAN OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE DELAY TIME
MEAN OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE TIME
USAGE FACTOR
ENERGIZED TIME
NUMBER OF FAILED EVENTS
DOWN TIME
NUMBER OF MEASURED EVENTS
CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE TIME
LOGISTICS TIME
TIME WAITING FOR OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE
NUMBER OF LOGISTICS DELAYS
NUMBER OF OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE DELAYS
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SHIPS PROGRAM-GUN SYSTEM DATA COLLECTION SCREENS






Shot fired NO gun failure
Gun FAILURE proceed to record
Record On Station Time
Record Ready Time
Record Mission Complete Time
Record Check Fire Time
Record Cancel Check Fire Time
Record Counter Battery Time
Current Mount MT 51
Rounds Fired During Mission
Rounds Fired Since Data Collection Began
Press one of the indicated keys to continue
M - Manual entry P-Previous screen
R-Repair Time Complete Z-Shift Mounts
E-Gunshoot has ended
5 INCH 54 MK45 NAVAL GUN SYSTEM DATA COLLECTION PROGRAM
1 - LOWER ACCUMULATOR SYSTEM
2 - LOWER HOIST ASSEMBLY
3 - LOADER DRUM ASSEMBLY
4 - UPPER HOIST ASSEMBLY
5 - PUSE SETTER ASSEMBLY
6 - UPPER ACCUMULATOR ASSEMBLY
7 - CRADLE AND RAMMER ASSEMBLY
8 - GUN BARREL HOUSING ASSEMBLY
9 - BREECH MECHANISM
10 - RECOIL COUNTERRECOIL SYSTEM
1 1 - EMPTY CASE TRAY ASSEMBLY
N - Next screen
P-Previous screen-no gun failure
Q- Quit program
64
5 INCH 54 MK45 NAVAL GUN SYSTEM DATA COLLECTION PROGRAM
R - Gun system has been repaired-contmue with mission ,
Choose Mount that has been Repaired
1 - Mount 51
2 - Mount 52
P-Previous screen-choose a different block
Z-Shift gunmounts Continue with Mission
M - Manual data entry
65
APPENDIX F
SPOTTERS PROGRAM DATA COLLECTION SCREENS
5 INCH 54 MK45 NA VAL GUN SYSTEM t
F - Function
N - NonFunction
L - Lost Round
H - Hit
R - Repeat























PROJECTILE AND POWDER DATA FROM kk SHIPS
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10/1/91 USS GETTYSBURG 95
10/24/91 USS BRISCOE 85
10/26/91 USS STUMP 106
11/26/91 USS HUE CITY 82
4/10/92 USS O ' BANNON 83
5/7/92 USS MOOSEBRUGGER 81
6/26/92 USS PETERSEN 81
7/16/92 USS ROGERS 95
7/23/92 USS DEYO 93
7/30/92 USS HAYLER 72
12/9/92 USS VIRGINIA 75
4/13/93 USS SAN JACINTO 87
4/17/93 USS ROGERS 103
1219 i ROUNDS; FIRED
BLOCK BLOCK REPAIR TIME MTTR PERCENT
NUMBER NAME (:SECS) (SECS) FAILURES
#2 LOWER HOIST 20 20 .00082%













#9 BREECH 14929 14929 .00082%
#16 TRAIN POWER DRIVE 2632 2632 .00082%
#37 28V POWER SUPPLY 687 687 .00082%
#41 BLOWER MOTOR 753
699 726 .00164%
#43 EP2 PANEL/CABLING 248
192 220 .00164%
01722%









1.13 Firing Rata For DD_







1.93 Firing Rata For DO -01GUN-1
1.02 Firing Rata For DO -01GUN-2
1.47 AveFiringRata
3.77 MissionTima






1.18 Firing Rata For DO -01GUN-1
0.22 Firing Rata For DO -01GON-2'
0.70 AveFiringRata
6.33 MissionTima . >




L.18 Firing Rata For DO -01GON-1
0.22 Firing Rata For DO -01GOM-2
0.70 AveFiringRata
$.33 MissionTima




1.13 Firing Rata For 0D -01GOM-1







End oC Simulation Stats
5 Total number oC Repetitions
Average Firing Rata For DO -01GUN-1
Average Firing Rata For DO -01GUN-2
0.30 Global Average Firing Rata
7.22 */- 0.75 Average Mission Time
153 94 */- 19.10 Average Time Integral Target Value
,*»*.».i«********************************* ********************************
„,,..»,««*«*»**********»*** ************************************************







Results From NGFS Mission Z-^u-G. (Callahan, 1993)
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OutDut from NGFS at: Mon May 3 1 22:45:56 1993
Rep number: 1
1.07 Firing Rata Far DO -OlGUN-l







1.43 Firing Rata For DD -OlGUN-l







1.07 Firing Rata For DO -OlGUN-l







0.70 Firing Rata For DD -01GON-1
0.28 Firing Rata For DO -01GUN-2
0.49 AveFiringRata
10.90 MissionTima




1.07 Firing Rata For DO -OlGUN-l






End of Simulation Stat3
5 Total number of Repetitions
1.07 •»-/- o.2 3 Average Firing Rata For DD_
0.35 ••-/- 0.14 Average Firing Rata For DD~
0.71 -f/- 0.18 Global Average Firing Rate
10.00 +/- 2.53 Average Mission Time
195.57 +•/- 42.43 Average Time Integral Target Value
NGFS Completed execution successfully at Mon May 31 22:45:57 1993
Results From NGFS Mission Z-42-G. (Callahan, 1993)
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Output: from NGFS at Mon May 3L 2 2:35:41 199 3
Rep number: 1
1.36 Firing Rate For 00 -01GCN-1





3.8 4 Theoretical Ef
Rap number: 2
2.00 Firing Rata For DD -01GUN-1
1.03 Firing Rata For DD -01GUN-2
1.51 AveFiringRata
7.70 MissionTime




1.3 6 Firing Rata For DD -01GUN-1







i.36 Firing Rata For DD -01GUN-1







1.36 Firing Rate For 00 -01GUN-1






Total number of Repetitions
Average Firing Rata For DD -oiGUK-l
Average Firing Rata For DD -01GUN-2
Global Average Firing Rate
Average Mission Time
Average Time Integral Target Value
«#«»»«»*»»»#*******»**«***»»*»*»»»**»«**«******»****»*»*»»**•************
•••a************************************************************** •*•*•**•
NGFS Comp.aced execution successfully at Mon May 31 22:35:42 1993
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